

Berlin, 12 May, 2006; FI & HBS

On Militarism, Economy and Gender: Working in a Global Context¹

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'... in contemporary post-Cold wars, economics is increasingly replacing ideology as the motive or legitimising force for conflict. Such conflicts do not so much represent the continuation of politics by other means as the continuation of business by other means.' (Cooper, 2002:942).

Two approaches to causes of violent conflict seem to currently inform mainstream international agencies and NGO practice. One is that violent conflict is caused by poverty and underdevelopment; another define the causes as bad governance and the so-called failed state. Consequently, the work of many international agencies and international NGOs alike is focused on 'income generating' and on 'good governance'. Gender sensitive agencies and organizations pick up the same fields of engagement, but then focus on the inclusion of women into economic and political processes.

Linking poverty and governance to violent conflict in itself is not a problem, for the study of, and the work in these fields, bring in valuable insights into the dynamics of economic and political processes in the countries in conflict. However, remaining on these two foci only, leads to a few peculiar consequences. Firstly, all too often these are simply seen as *the causes*, and addressed as such, ignoring many other relevant dynamics - dynamics of gender relations among others. Even the 'gender

sensitive' approaches often end up being 'bringing women in' whatever the agency or the organization is doing on the ground. Such approaches use 'gender' as a misnomer for 'women', ignoring not only the role of men in the process, but also all the institutional and ideological aspects of economy and governance that impact upon structures of gendered – and all other – inequalities and exclusions.

Secondly, in such approaches, the dynamics of war and violence are firmly situated 'out there' – in the specific Third World regions, countries and localities - and 'their' problems. Thus, the larger, global economic and political dynamics, and more specifically, the role of the West in the economies and politics of the Third World countries and the wars unfolding in these countries, is often absent from the agencies' and NGOs' analyses and from the work on the ground. Many agencies and NGOs pursuing gender sensitive approaches do their best to ensure that women are included in local economies and politics, but how these local economies and politics rate on national, regional and global scale, and what are their global gender dynamics in the context of neo-liberal dictates of economy, would hardly be known, or addressed.²

Furthermore, seeing poverty and bad governance in the Third World countries as the main causes of violent conflicts converges all too easily with now already widely accepted – but for this not less problematic - assumptions about the so-called 'changing nature of wars', and the emergences of the so-called 'new wars' (Kaldor, 1999). Therein, yet another cause of violence is added to the poverty and failed state arguments: identity politics. The 'new wars' are defined as intra-state conflict where ethnic and tribal identities drive local warlords and their vicious paramilitaries to plunder the local/ national natural and other resources, with total disregard for international rules of laws and through deliberate targeting of the civilian population.

In this argumentation, the economic argument about poverty is modified so as to make the poverty the result of the continuous violence, and not (only) the cause of it. The argument on bad governance and the failed state also receives a twist, linking corruption and the lack of the state's legitimacy to the grip of the warlord.

Wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Central Asia (former Soviet Republics) and Central and West Africa have all been defined as the 'new wars', with local dynamics of greed, warlordism, privatisation of violence, criminalization of economy are deliberate targeting of the civilians. Gender sensitive approaches have often focused on the last point - violent aspect of the identity politics vis-à-vis civilians, and on the deliberate targeting of women. Highlighting use of rape of women and girls in war, ensuring international, national and local legal and physical protection of women and persecution of perpetrators, and aiding the women and girls raped in wars has become a major aspect of work of many international and national organizations and agencies.

These assumptions and the work based on them, while engaging with the violent local realities, bringing relief to, and pursuing justice for the local population, all too often create a conceptual abyss between the wars fought by the so-called 'local war-lords' and the wars fought by the Western powers, reducing the former to local identity politics, greed and barbarism, and exonerating the latter as 'humanitarian interventions'. In doing so they ignore two things. One is the crucial role of identity politics in the contemporary wars fought by the Western powers. Think of wars over Falklands, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the first and second Gulf wars and all the gendered politics of Western identities invested in them.³ Another is obscuring the continuing role of the Western corporate and political involvements in the violent plundering of the natural resources of the Third World countries. Think of Great Lake

Region, West Africa, and Gulf, and the role of multinational corporations in extracting and trading 'conflict diamonds', rare minerals and oil, with support of Western governments. Thus a gender sensitive international NGO may be involved with a women's group offering economic and political support on local, or even national scale, but how much real change is possible if at the same time natural resources of the country used to finance the war or the post war reconstruction (or any other natural resources, for that matter) are controlled by the nexus of national elites and multinational corporations, and traded on Western markets with the support of Western governments and international regulations.

The main problem here is that these two realities – the reality of an international NGO working with the 'locals' and the reality of the global economy and politics – often never meet. The devastations that the wars inflict on local realities are often so huge that international NGOs and agencies involved in remedying them hardly have any time to stop and look around. A more cynical assumption is that looking beyond the 'local realities' of the particular Third World country or region would not suite the interests of the international/ Western NGOs. For then, they would have to turn their gaze back onto themselves, their own 'local realities', and especially - their own, Western governments. But I will argue that this is precisely what is needed at this moment. For focusing the gaze on the local realities somewhere there, far away, looking at the African and Balkan 'war lords' and their greed and cruelty, not only exonerates the West from its involvement in Third World *economy and politics of war*, which are essentially global - not local – processes, but also makes invisible two important aspects of these processes: one is the growing militarization of global economies (as well as governance); another is the genderedness of these processes.

It is the genderedness and the militarization of global economy, and the role of the Western geo-politics in it, that I wish to concentrate at. I do not wish to disregard the relevance of the local realities, and all the structures and practices of inequality and exclusion that exists in many Third World countries, and to simply pin the blame on 'the global forces'. Rather I wish to ask: *in what ways do specific global political and economic realities become an element of the local process of gendered social exclusions; and in what ways specific local economic and political dynamics become an element in gendering of global redistribution of power.*

The *specificity* of all these dynamics is of utmost relevance here. For unlike the theoreticians of the so-called 'new wars', my intention is not to create a general theory of the contemporary violent conflict, and subsume any of the contemporary wars – be it genocide in Rwanda, or the USA-led war in Iraq - under a few general headings. Rather, while pointing to specific global processes such as militarization, I wish to stress the importance of *analyzing the dynamics between these global processes and the local, national and regional dynamics, in all their complexity.*

Understanding the un-reducibility of any violent conflict to any global trend is necessary for strategic reasons – without this understanding, any engagement with many local processes and actors engaged in or affected by a violent conflict can do more harm than good. However, ignoring the impact of the global processes on the local realities, and the way they reinforce or undermine each other, is equally dangerous. For no contemporary strategy for social justice, including gender justice, can be taken seriously if it ignores global dynamics.

My focus on gender too, is cautious, for when I use the concept I do not presume that gender means women. I do not think that adding men is enough, or even that gender is reducible to specific femininities and masculinities. Rather, I use gender

to indicate *the processes by which particular women and men acquire their social place, and particular masculinities and femininities come into being*. I perceive both development and violent conflict as such processes – they produce, sustain, foster or subvert specific – ethnicized, communalised, racialized - femininities and masculinities. They create conditions by which dominant hierarchical, or alternative, egalitarian femininities and masculinities flourish or wither. Without dominant assumptions about men as breadwinners or soldiers and women as symbols of communities and home-makers, without definitions of masculinities through power and heteronormativity and femininities through (sexual) vulnerability, development practice as well as violent practices of an armed conflict would look very different.

Thus engaging in violent conflict and development practice for practitioners means always – whether willing or not – engaging with gendered processes, and their gendered consequences. The same can be said for the global economy – it is a gendered process, marked not only by the *assumptions about women's and men's economic and political agency*, but also by the *very tangible structures of inequality and exclusion* that support and further enforce these assumptions. It is the genderedness of some of these global processes and structures, and its nexus with militarization that I wish to point to, in the following section.

Gender, militarism and global economy

In February 2005, International Labour Organization issued a Brief stating that global markets of capital and labour are becoming 'more integrated and ever more dependent on large multinational enterprises' (Global Employment Trends, Brief 2005:5; in future text GET). Today, the top ten multinational corporations account for 76 percent

of global production, the five biggest of which account for 50 percent.⁴ In other words, multinationals are today the main driving force of economic production, trade and investments.

Thus, one could argue that, if anything is changing, it is not so much *the nature of wars as the nature of capitalism* – through its multinationalization, its metropolization (Duffield, 2002:1054), its consolidation in the centres (largely the West) and exclusion of peripheries (Castells, 1996, in Duffield 2002).⁵

Globalization as multinationalization of production with outsourcing (and insourcing) of manufacturing and service sector jobs and opening of the global textile market has been noted for creating jobs. But while some recent employment statistics show that in the last decade global unemployment slightly fell and that employment is slowly growing, the fact is that looking at global trends only obscures regional picture of unemployment.⁶ Actually, for many regions – including Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia - the question is not any longer only of unemployment but of something that could be called *structural unemployability* of large sections of population, and especially male youth (GET for Youth, 2004).

Furthermore, globalized multinationalized economy has lead not only to higher insecurity and lower protection of labour, but also to the deficit of decent work - i.e. work by which one can sustain oneself and one's family - and the growing number of working poor. The number of the working poor (earning under \$1 per day) is steadily increasing, especially in the low-income countries, with women's share in working poor being 60-70 percent (GET for Women 2004).⁷ Obviously, the employment statistics say nothing about the *quality of jobs and structural poverty of large sections of employed*. Women are for example more likely to find employment in agriculture and informal sector, with little if any regulatory framework, legal

protection or social benefit (GET for Women 2004:3). Export-processing zones (an important source of women's employment in formal economy) see more men enter the sector with the higher technological inputs and higher wage, pushing women out (ibid p.12). In service sector employment – community, social and personal services - concentration of women is the highest, while men dominate in better-paid, financial and business service jobs (ibid p.12). Female wage for the same work remains lower than male, though in the so-called 'transitional economies' of the former socialist countries female wage is still closest to male (98%), but getting lower in high-skill sector (88%) (ibid).

Being the driving force of economy, multinational companies have direct impact on daily livelihoods of global population. One only has to think of multinationals' control over pharmaceutical production and agricultural trade rules, to understand that daily livelihoods mean literally life and death chances of endless millions of children, men and women. The ILO Brief 2005, for example, notes that in 2005 there were 3.2 million deaths of working-age population from HIV/AIDS. Two thirds of these are in Africa, and rapidly growing.⁸ For them, as for the HIV/AIDS affected population across poor regions and countries, and poor social groups in rich countries, cheap drugs would certainly mean not only longer, and better quality life, but simply - life.

When it comes to the control of agricultural production and trade, it is worth noting that in Sub-Saharan Africa 7 out of 10 people work in agriculture, and majority of these are women (GET for Women, 2004). In the context in which global policies regulating agricultural production and trade make fair trade impossible, their products cannot compete with highly subsidized European and USA agricultural products. Not to mention actual destruction of local agricultural production for the cash-crop.

These economic trends are global, and they affect population in Western and Eastern Europe as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America, but they have different consequences in different parts of the world. In Western and Eastern Europe, the growth of right wing radical political parties is often linked to the lack of economic and social opportunities of the majority of population, especially male youth. In Western Europe, furthermore, the growth of male unemployment has galvanized workers unions as well as public opinion against opening towards East European, former socialist countries, bringing the process of European unification to an abrupt halt.⁹ In Africa and Latin America, young male unemployment, together with a general lack of peaceful, legal and legitimate social options, have been noted as major reasons for the failure of the reintegration of the ex-combatants¹⁰.

Furthermore, many authors have been pointing to the apparent contradictions between economic and political goals of the post-conflict development. Economic policies for post-war reconstruction pushed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Structural Adjustment being the major factor) are said to contribute to the old, and create new processes of economic and social exclusion, and thus run contrary to the processes of social reintegration, crucial for disarmament and demobilization.¹¹ Furthermore, the former are often pursued by the state, and the latter all too often left to the local (women's) and international NGOs, creating yet another set of contradictions.¹²

Slow to none increase of employment, structural unemployability, and the uneven distribution of the two globally, show that the so-called information economy in the North has rendered population of half of the globe "structurally irrelevant" from an economic point of view' (Duffield 2002:1054), and that, with exception of a few precious commodities, raw material and cheap labour on their own are no longer

sufficient to guarantee a place within the dominant networks of the global economy' (Duffield 2002:1054). This is especially evident in relation to the former Soviet Union and Africa. African share in world trade in 1950s was 3%, in mid 1990s it was 1.2% and is falling (Cooper, 2002:940). Duffield (2002) argues that since 1970s there is a general collapse of investment in African economy, with exception of extracting economy. And it is here, in the extracting economies of Africa, where the nexus of gender, militarism and economy, and the involvement of the West are most evident. For these are the economies that fuel some of the most vicious African wars, wherein multinational companies and Western governments are engaged with local, national, regional and international actors in a vicious circles of injustice, exclusion and violence.

Diamond production and the wars in the West and Central Africa, and especially the Great Lakes Region, are probably the worst of examples. The clandestine nature of the production and trade of diamonds is obvious in a simple statistics that tell that in 1999, Liberia officially recognized production of \$1 million worth of diamonds, while only in Belgium \$298 million worth imported diamonds were registered as originated in Liberia.¹³

The engagements of local elites with multinational extracting and trading companies and their private military security; various local armed forces and (para)militaries; regional governments and their diverse (para)militaries; Western governments and their links with multinationals; Western semi-governmental organization hiring mercenaries and military security; armies of dispensable child-soldiers slaving in the mines and transporting diamonds on foot across West and Central Africa; multinational companies producing and trading light weapons and small arms arming these child-soldiers; legal and illegal networks trading in the

`conflict goods' - and the list goes on - tell us about the complexities that cannot be easily resolved by working with local communities and women's groups. These communities and groups are an indispensable part of the solution, but the processes that drive the production and trade of the `conflict goods' are only by a very small part, if at all, in their hands. Abduction of children for soldiering and mining, for example, may be in the hands of local warlords, and the local communities are devising various means of protection. But the production and trade of the conflict goods, as well as of the small arms, are not controlled on the local level.¹⁴ Democratic Republic of Congo is an example here.

Diamond mines of the DR of Congo have been exploited and controlled by the (para)militaries of most of the countries involved in the violent conflict, from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, to Angola and Sudan, as well as by various multinational companies, in agreement with the (para)militaries. In 1998, while Kabila father was fighting elsewhere in the country, his finance minister was heading a meeting with about 30 representatives of foreign companies in Kinshasa, making a \$ 1billion deal contracts for extracting diamonds and gold. In 2000 an Israeli company was given exclusive production right, worth \$ 600 million a year. In 2001, Congo announced liberalization of diamond production, making North American companies its crucial partner.¹⁵

And it is not only extracting companies that are involved in these war economies. Many other Western companies – supported by their governments – are a part of the chain.¹⁶ For example, UK led a campaign in the UN on `conflict diamonds' from Sierra Leone and supported UN sanctions against Liberia who breached UN regulations. But UK remains to be the biggest exporter of arms to Sierra Leone and did nothing when a UK based air-company shipped arms to Sierra Leone. Actually,

the UK Ministry of Defence awarded this same company a contract to fly UK helicopters sold to South Africa. Both the company and the government claimed that they were not aware of company's involvement in breaching the UN embargo for Sierra Leone (Cooper, 2002: 947). Similarly, Coltan, a mineral essential for production of mobile phones and computer chips, is extracted in, and flown from Democratic Republic of Congo by Belgian air-line Sabena, to be sold to UK, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Kenya, India, Pakistan and Russia (Cooper, 2002: 951).

Many individuals, organizations, watch-dog groups and NGOs concerned with 'conflict goods', including 'blood diamonds' are engaged in highlighting the problem.¹⁷ They record involvement of Western governments and semi-governmental institutions in the extraction and trade of the goods; global, regional and local political and military involvements; movements of mercenaries and other (para)military and security personnel hired by the multinationals or the (Western) governments; the (in many cases) systematic violations of human rights of the local population committed by the security forces hired by the mining and oil companies in Africa and Latin America, as well as by the (local and regional) governments. They also lobby for the legislation and rules for the so-called 'corporate responsibility'. But the work of these groups and NGOs seems not to have reached international agencies and organizations involved in development practice and post-war reconstruction who continue to focus on the local level and local actors, and in so doing support 'the general silence [...] around the complicity of a broad range of Western companies and economies in conflict trade' (Cooper 2002:951).

Extracting economies are clearly globalized, multinationalized, and intricately linked to militarization¹⁸. As the examples above show, militarization is the very

condition of these economies, as extracting economies feed into, and are in turn fed by violent conflict.

Militarization however does not remain on the level of economy, but enters other social domains. *Local livelihoods and the futures of the men and women in the war zones* are inextricably linked to the *actual economic prospects* offered or destroyed by the extracting economies, including prospects of gaining access, controlling and enjoying goods, services and people through the use of violence. But equally important, these futures are also linked to the *symbolic meanings of masculinities and femininities* – to what it means to be a (young) man or a woman in a particular context. If being a man means having control over goods, services and people, then this control will be strived for. And if there are no peaceful, legal or legitimate means of achieving it, then violence may become an ever more legitimised, even if not legitimate, option. Research on Northern Uganda, for example, shows how dominant notions of masculinity, social expectations of men and the use of violence intersect with social exclusion based on tribal and ethnic identities (El-Bushra, forthcoming). When men of a specific group are excluded from achieving prescribed norms of masculinity, it is not only their tribal identity, but also their identity as men, that is threatened. This inevitably brings militarization of masculinities, and normalization of violence as a means of achieving manhood. International concern with addressing tribal, religious or ethnic exclusions in the post-conflict periods by securing equal access to political means to all groups (like in Afghanistan or Iraq) is obviously crucial. But doing so without addressing how these group identities intersect with dominant notions of masculinity may end up legitimizing militarized masculinities, bringing benefits to specific groups of men, and actually reinforcing gender and age inequalities.¹⁹ Problem is that access to political means all too often

also means access to economic means – thus those who remain unrepresented politically often also face economic exclusion.

Obviously, the multinationalization of global economy has stark consequences for the future of the countries in conflict. Needless to say, the control of ‘conflict goods’ (and any other goods for that matter) established during the war extends its impact on the reconstruction and post-conflict peace-building, as it is the war elites together with multinational corporations that become key economic factors in controlling the goods in the post-war period (Cooper, 2002:941).²⁰

The fact that the actual violence is localized and explained off by identity politics and warlordism, continues to make its global dimensions hidden,²¹ and thus also hides the fact that the *live styles and national economies in the West* and in small sections of the Third World (such as urban centres of India or China) are intrinsically linked to the violent destruction of livelihoods in the war zones. Consequently, growing militarization of the West also remains obscure. One significant aspect of this militarization is that military and security forces are becoming ever more relevant local and global job suppliers. An estimate of six million military personnel redundant after the break up of the USSR and the restructuring of the Western militaries are today being hired by the Western governments, non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations, corporate world and various warring factions, in the form of private military and security firms, body-guards for VIP, guards of prison and other detention facilities (such as Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad), and as individuals and group for-hire for clandestine operations or direct fighting in wars in Africa and the Balkans. The market for private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs) was estimated at 100 billion \$US in 2001, growing at the rate of 10 billion \$US per year, and hugely expanding with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.²² It

is estimated that about 15 percent of USA employed military personnel in Iraq comes from the private military companies.²³ The USA and UK are using 70 percent of all the PMC/PSCs services²⁴.

To these military/security companies we should add a huge force of migrant, and low class, no-future young men, and ever increasing number of women for whom entry into the government armies of the West may be the only channel of social promotion, the only option of continuing education or securing livelihood or citizenship (such as the migrants without citizenship recruited by the USA government to fight in Iraq, with a promises of obtaining the citizenship after their term).²⁵ Finally, there is an unknown number of young men and women all over the world – including 300.000 youth and children under the age of 18 - who currently fight in the wars of Africa and Asia, and whose sex and economic slavery sustains armies, economies and wars. Children and youth make up more than half of many of the fighting forces in the ongoing violent conflicts in Africa, and girls make up to one third of these.²⁶

It is precisely the multiplicity of these diverse involvements that makes it imperative to situate economic processes and actors of any particular war into the context of larger geo-political shifts of power relations and the issues of social justice and exclusion. As long as militarization is not only a by product but actually *a mode of economic production*, post-war reconstruction will have to include *not only disarmament and demobilization of local men*, but also *de-militarization of global economy*. And this cannot be done only 'over there', in the Third World, where the wars are actually fought, but has to be 'over here' too, in the metropolises of the First World, where the economies are driven from.

Globalized Economy, Globalized Gender Regimes

If militarism is indeed a mode of today's economic multinationalized globalisation, and if indeed it is the nature of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism that is changing – by incorporating violent conflict and militarism - then it is reasonable to assume that development as a practice of neo-liberal state will also be marked by the same global condition. This would mean that neo-liberal development practice and violent conflict are not the opposites, with the former being a result of a functioning neo-liberal state and the latter a result of a 'failed state' but rather, *that violent conflict is intrinsic to the current practice of neo-liberal development*. This would also mean that the current linking of development aid and security issues in development agendas of the powerful North/West donors is not just a sudden shift in thinking, caused by terrorist attacks on New York, Madrid and London, but rather, a consequential phase of globalisation wherein *militarization has become a mode of economic production as well as social reproduction*.

One aspect of this global condition is that globalized militarised economies are dependent on and sustained through globalisation of specific gendered ideologies and practices, wherein militarization conditions lives of vast numbers of women and men. Consequently, globalized multinationalized, militarized economies would also depend on normalization of violence and militarization of femininities and masculinities on a mass scale. In other words, militarization of femininities and masculinities would be not only an outcome of contemporary global processes, but *their very condition*.

Feminist post-colonial studies have already shown that hegemonic notions and practices of masculinity and femininity served not only as a function of sexual and racial (or rather, sexist and racist) control and segregation, but were the very function

of colonial ruling (Sinha, 1995, Sharpe, 1991). Assumptions of difference among variously positioned masculinities and femininities between and among the colonized and the colonizers were essential to the entire colonial projects. These assumptions are not difficult to relate to the differences assumed in the 'new war' theories, or indeed in the concepts of the 'war on terror' or 'humanitarian interventions' wherein different men and women, different masculinities and femininities, figure prominently as symbols of specific communities: cosmopolitan masculinities vis-à-vis particularist and violent masculinities; Muslim terrorist man and Muslim victimized woman vis-à-vis emancipated Western woman; democratically elected Western male/female politician vis-à-vis (post)communist and post-colonial male dictator; blood thirsty, drugged and drunken young male African boy-soldiers (with a cut-off head in his hands – the picture dominating TV screens in 2005 fighting in the capital city of Liberia) vis-à-vis USA/coalition soldiers in proper uniform, and under a heavy load of high-tech equipment.

History of colonization is a part and parcel of the history of development, and both are inseparable from the history of capitalism. In all of these histories, gender hierarchies and notions of masculinity and femininity have been crucial for the reproduction of the practices of ruling, and were continuously institutionalised through gendered economic and political structures of social exclusion as well as through various forms of symbolic representations. The same applies today. The contemporary nexus of economy-cum-militarism is dependent on specific gendered hierarchies and specific practices of masculinity and femininity, and thus is in dire need of reproducing them.

But hegemonic models of traditional gender hierarchies with domesticated femininities and public masculinities appear to be in flux. While gender ideologies

prescribing these hierarchies are still alive and kicking, in many societies men cannot afford the access to property and influence, political leverage and social status, or control of people and goods required by the dominant norms of proper manhood, as economic, political and larger social structures supporting such hierarchies have crumbled.

In the context of structural unemployability of many men, and overwhelming structural poverty of the employed (women) with the ever more exploitable labour of children, contemporary gender regimes seem to be characterized by ambiguity and contradictions between prescribed social norms and actual social practices, and a disjunction between what is socially expected of women and men, and what majority of them can actually achieve. When we look at this disjunction from a perspective of intersections between development practice and violent conflict, we are increasingly facing a situation in which *violent conflict* appears to provide to many men, and to an increasing number of women, what classical development practice was expected and supposed to provide: economic and political power, and material and symbolic benefits. And not only in places such as Northern Uganda, DR Congo or Afghanistan. Kosovo and India, but ever more so in places such as the Netherlands, UK, and USA. At the same time, this same intersection between violent conflict and development is robbing a vast majority of women, men and children – and the absolute majority of them in the countries of the Third World - of any chance of decent life, or simply - life.

And still, it seems that it is easier for an international/Western agencies and organizations to concern themselves with young African men carrying machetes and cut-off heads, and the raped African and Balkan women – those who seem to have ‘failed’ in their gender roles according to the dominant prescriptions - and not with

the 'achievers' in the metropolis, including ourselves: those who live and practice multiple options of manhood and womanhood, genuinely concerned with peace and justice in the world, willing to do everything so that Africa and the Balkans become peaceful and prosperous (again), and still blind to our own back yards, where our own government officials, CEOs of multinational and security companies and leaders of international agencies make sure that our cell phones and computers are being produced, albeit through the wars 'over there'.

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Endnotes:

¹ Different arguments from and versions of this text were presented at a conference *Whose Security? Gender and Southern Perspectives*, organized by APRODEV, (Brussels, Belgium, October 2005), and an ISS Staff Group 2 seminar (Den Haag, The Netherlands, May 2006). I am grateful for all comments and suggestions. The shortcomings of the text remain mine.

² See Ruth Jacobson (forthcoming) on questioning the wisdom of pushing women into the governments, when these government's policies are dictated by the neo-liberal agendas of international agencies such as World Bank and IMF.

³ See for example Seidel & Gunther (1988) on construction of gendered identities in UK press during the Falklands war, and Farmanfarmaian (1992) and Forde (1995) on gendered rhetoric in the USA and media representations in UK during the first Gulf war.

⁴ Peter Morgan <http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/sr243/morgan.htm> (no date). The combined revenues of General Motors and Ford exceeds the GDP for all of sub-Saharan Africa.

⁵ Castell (1996) argues that consolidation and exclusion are replacing expansion and inclusion as characteristics of global capitalism. See also Duffield (1997) on aid as a practice of containment.

⁶ Unemployment fell only in developed economies and Europe and in Middle East and North Africa, while in all other world regions it grew. See GET Brief Feb 2005.

⁷ In 1986 – 536 million; in 2004/5 - 550 million people (world empl report 2004/2005, ILO, December 2004).

⁸ The impact of HIV/AIDS on labour in Africa is especially noted in the ILO Brief 2005. In 1995 Africa lost 2.8 million potential workers, equalling to 1.2 percent of total labour force. In 2005 the loss grew to 19.9 million, or 6.3 percent of the labour force. Estimates for 2015 are 49.6 million, or 12% of the labour force.

⁹ The fear that east European workers will take over jobs in the West is kindled by the press where instances of the 'take-over' are regularly counted. But all the statistics show that West European unemployment is not affected by the newly admitted countries. Actually unemployment in Eastern Europe is growing since joining EU, as former socialist countries face structural adjustment and are cast open to the globalized trade and production (see ILO Brief 2005, and Ibrahimov, no date).

¹⁰ See for example Utas (2005) for Liberia, and Fithen & Richards for Sierra Leone (2005).

¹¹ See Zack-Williams (1999) for Sierra Leone and de Soto & del Castillo (1994) for El Salvador

¹² Duffield (1997, 2002) argues that a new form of global liberal governance is emerging as a result of withdrawal of the state from the public sector, and the power Western states and international organizations have over Third World states. Others show that NGOs – and especially women’s NGOs - are often expected to do what neither national governments nor international agencies can achieve (bring about reconciliation, for example). See Helms (2003) about women’s NGOs in Bosnia

¹³ See www.ploughshares.ca.

¹⁴ See www.bicc.de (Bonn International Center for Conversion) for information on production, trade and legislation of small arms and light weapons.

¹⁵ See www.ploughshares.ca

¹⁶ See for example information at www.somo.nl, Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, Amsterdam.

¹⁷ On African wars especially see websites such as: www.ploughshares.ca (see especially armed conflict reports on this site!), www.child-soldiers.org, www.childsoldiers.org. See also www.whrnet.org (women’s human rights net), www.hrw.org (human rights watch), www.amnesty.org (amnesty international), and www.un.org (and different UN agencies). For documentation on extracting economy and conflict see www.globalwitness.org and www.fataltransaction.org.

¹⁸ While I focus in this text on militarization of extracting economies, it is worth noting that military industrial complex is a significant, and since 1998 hugely growing segment of the global economy. In 2002, in which another sharp increase in military spending occurred (to result in just under \$US 800 billion) the USA accounted for 43% of world military expenditure, and the top 5 spenders (the USA, Japan, the UK, France and China) for 62% (SIPRI Yearbook 2003). Therein, the production and trade of arms (from the cheap small arms, land mines and plastic explosives to the most sophisticated bombers and surveillance technology) is a huge factor in the globalized, multinationalized, militarized extracting economies of Central and West Africa. War in Iraq is another apt example how extracting economies, high military technology, and cheap home-made weapons make a deadly concoction.

¹⁹ Bosnia and Kosovo are good examples for neglect of gender in the process. See Rees (2002) for Bosnia and Abdela(2004) for Kosovo how women have been excluded from the international and local organizations during and after the wars. Earlier mentioned references Utas (2005) for Liberia, and Fithen & Richards for Sierra Leone (2005) tell about re-marginalization of specific groups of young men in the post-war processes.

²⁰ Needless to say, whatever control escaped multinationals during the conflict, once the fighting is over these companies are being drafted to rebuild the war-torn economies: in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq anything from telecommunications to water, oil and building is ‘tendered’ to multinationals.

²¹ See Finnstrom (2005) for local-global dynamics and involvement of different parties in the war in Northern Uganda.

²² See the website of the International Committee of the Red Cross, for its use of PMCs/PSCs <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/63he58?opendocument>, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Private_Military_Corporations of the SourceWatch and www.bicc.de of the Bonn International Centre for Conversion for

issues and problems related to use of the PMC/PSCs, and Amnesty International guidance for upholding Human Rights, and controlling the security companies at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engACT700011998?open&of=eng-398>.

²³ See <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mercenary.htm>

²⁴ See <http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=2182> for the list of UK based PMC/PSC operating in Iraq.

²⁵ Since recently, USA juvenile prison system has been giving military service as an option to young male offenders, indicating further that the entry of young men (and women) into the army is not a self-evident choice, but rather an option amidst the lack of other options. In the same lane, it is worth noting that an increasing lack of while Dutch men who chose employment in the military has make the military leadership in the Netherlands to turn to women and migrant men as potential recruits (see Zarkov & Joachim 2001).

²⁶ See Mazurana and Carlson (forthcoming), Mazurana et al (2002) and McKay & Mazurana (2004).